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A Primer on Strategic Games
Krzysztof R. Apt∗
Abstract
This is a short introduction to the subject of strategic games. We focus on
the concepts of best response, Nash equilibrium, strict and weak dominance, and
mixed strategies, and study the relation between these concepts in the context of
the iterated elimination of strategies. Also, we discuss some variants of the original
definition of a strategic game. Finally, we introduce the basics of mechanism design
and use pre-Bayesian games to explain it.
1 Introduction
Mathematical game theory, as launched by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in their sem-
inal book, von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944], followed by Nash’s contributions Nash
[1950, 1951], has become a standard tool in economics for the study and description of
various economic processes, including competition, cooperation, collusion, strategic be-
haviour and bargaining. Since then it has also been successfully used in biology, political
sciences, psychology and sociology. With the advent of the Internet game theory became
increasingly relevant in computer science.
One of the main areas in game theory are strategic games (sometimes also called
non-cooperative games), which form a simple model of interaction between profit
maximising players. In strategic games each player has a payoff function that he aims to
maximise and the value of this function depends on the decisions taken simultaneously
by all players. Such a simple description is still amenable to various interpretations,
depending on the assumptions about the existence of private information. The purpose
of this primer is to provide a simple introduction to the most common concepts used
in strategic games: best response, Nash equilibrium, dominated strategies and mixed
strategies and to clarify the relation between these concepts.
In the first part we consider the case of games with complete information. In the
second part we discuss strategic games with incomplete information, by introducing first
the basics of the theory of mechanism design that deals with ways of preventing strategic
behaviour, i.e., manipulations aiming at maximising one’s profit. We focus on the concepts,
examples and results, and leave simple proofs as exercises.
∗Centrum for Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI), Science Park 123, 1098 XG Amsterdam,
the Netherlands, and University of Amsterdam.
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2 Basic concepts
Assume a set {1, . . . , n} of players, where n > 1. A strategic game (or non-cooperative
game) for n players, written as (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn), consists of
• a non-empty (possibly infinite) set Si of strategies ,
• a payoff function pi : S1 × . . .× Sn → R,
for each player i.
We study strategic games under the following basic assumptions:
• players choose their strategies simultaneously ; subsequently each player receives a
payoff from the resulting joint strategy,
• each player is rational , which means that his objective is to maximise his payoff,
• players have common knowledge of the game and of each others’ rationality.1
Here are three classic examples of strategic two-player games to which we shall return
in a moment. We represent such games in the form of a bimatrix, the entries of which are
the corresponding payoffs to the row and column players.
Prisoner’s Dilemma
C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1, 1
Battle of the Sexes
F B
F 2, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 2
Matching Pennies
H T
H 1,−1 −1, 1
T −1, 1 1,−1
We introduce now some basic notions that will allow us to discuss and analyse strategic
games in a meaningful way. Fix a strategic game
(S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn).
We denote S1 × . . .× Sn by S, call each element s ∈ S a joint strategy , or a strategy
profile, denote the ith element of s by si, and abbreviate the sequence (sj)j 6=i to s−i.
1Intuitively, common knowledge of some fact means that everybody knows it, everybody knows that
everybody knows it, etc.
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Occasionally we write (si, s−i) instead of s. Finally, we abbreviate ×j 6=iSj to S−i and use
the ‘−i’ notation for other sequences and Cartesian products.
We call a strategy si of player i a best response to a joint strategy s−i of his opponents
if
∀s′i ∈ Si pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i).
Next, we call a joint strategy s a Nash equilibrium if each si is a best response to
s−i, that is, if
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀s′i ∈ Si pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i).
So a joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium if no player can achieve a higher payoff by
unilaterally switching to another strategy.
Finally, we call a joint strategy s Pareto efficient if for no joint strategy s′
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} pi(s
′) ≥ pi(s) and ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n} pi(s
′) > pi(s).
That is, a joint strategy is Pareto efficient if no joint strategy is both a weakly better
outcome for all players and a strictly better outcome for some player.
Some games, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, have a unique Nash equilibrium, namely
(D,D), while some other ones, like the Matching Pennies, have no Nash equilibrium. Yet
other games, like the Battle of the Sexes, have multiple Nash equilibria, namely (F, F )
and (B,B). One of the peculiarities of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is that its Nash
equilibrium is the only outcome that is not Pareto efficient.
Let us return now to our analysis of an arbitrary strategic game (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn).
Let si, s
′
i be strategies of player i. We say that si strictly dominates s
′
i (or equivalently,
that s′i is strictly dominated by si) if
∀s−i ∈ S−i pi(si, s−i) > pi(s
′
i, s−i),
that si weakly dominates s
′
i (or equivalently, that s
′
i is weakly dominated by si) if
∀s−i ∈ S−i pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i) and ∃s−i ∈ S−i pi(si, s−i) > pi(s
′
i, s−i),
and that si dominates s
′
i (or equivalently, that s
′
i is dominated by si) if
∀s−i ∈ S−i pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i).
Further, we say that si is strictly dominant if it strictly dominates all other strategies
of player i and define analogously a weakly dominant and a dominant strategy.
Clearly, a rational player will not choose a strictly dominated strategy. As an illustra-
tion let us return to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this game for each player, C (cooperate)
is a strictly dominated strategy. So the assumption of players’ rationality implies that
each player will choose strategy D (defect). That is, we can predict that rational players
will end up choosing the joint strategy (D,D) in spite of the fact that the Pareto efficient
outcome (C,C) yields for each of them a strictly higher payoff.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game can be easily generalised to n players as follows. Assume
that each player has two strategies, C and D. Denote by Cn the joint strategy in which
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each strategy equals C and similarly with Dn. Further, given a joint strategy s−i of the
opponents of player i denote by |s−i(C)| the number of C strategies in s−i.
Assume now that ki and li, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are real numbers such that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have ki(n− 1) > li > 0. We put
pi(s) :=
{
ki|s−i(C)|+ li if si = D
ki|s−i(C)| if si = C.
Note that for n = 2, ki = 2 and li = 1 we get the original Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Then for all players i we have pi(C
n) = ki(n− 1) > li = pi(D
n), so for all players the
strategy profile Cn yields a strictly higher payoff than Dn. Yet for all players i strategy C
is strictly dominated by strategy D, since for all s−i ∈ S−i we have pi(D, s−i)−pi(C, s−i) =
li > 0.
Whether a rational player will never choose a weakly dominated strategy is a more
subtle issue that we shall not pursue here.
By definition, no player achieves a higher payoff by switching from a dominant strategy
to another strategy. This explains the following obvious observation.
Note 2.1 (Dominant Strategy). Consider a strategic game G. Suppose that s is a joint
strategy such that each si is a dominant strategy. Then it is a Nash equilibrium of G.
In particular, the conclusion of the lemma holds if each si is a strictly or a weakly
dominant strategy. In the former case, when the game is finite, we can additionally assert
(see the IESDS Theorem 3.2 below) that s is a unique Nash equilibrium of G. This
stronger claim does not hold if each si is a weakly dominant strategy. Indeed, consider
the game
L R
T 1, 1 1, 1
B 1, 1 0, 0
Here T is a weakly dominant strategy for the player 1, L is a weakly dominant strategy
for player 2 and, as prescribed by the above Note, (T, L), is a Nash equilibrium. However,
this game has two other Nash equilibria, (T,R) and (B,L).
The converse of the above Note of course is not true. Indeed, there are games in which
no strategy is dominant, and yet they have a Nash equilibrium. An example is the Battle
of the Sexes game that has two Nash equilibria, but no dominant strategy.
So to find a Nash equilibrium (or Nash equilibria) of a game it does not suffice to
check whether a dominant strategy exists. In what follows we investigate whether iterated
elimination of strategies can be of help.
3 Iterated elimination of strategies I
3.1 Elimination of strictly dominated strategies
We assumed that each player is rational. So when searching for an outcome that is optimal
for all players we can safely remove strategies that are strictly dominated by some other
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strategy. This can be done in a number of ways. For example, we could remove all or
some strictly dominated strategies simultaneously, or start removing them in a round
robin fashion starting with, say, player 1. To discuss this matter more rigorously we
introduce the notion of a restriction of a game.
Given a game G := (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn) and (possibly empty) sets of strategies
R1, . . . , Rn such that Ri ⊆ Si for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we say that R := (R1, . . . , Rn, p1, . . . , pn)
is a restriction of G. Here of course we view each pi as a function on the subset
R1× . . .×Rn of S1× . . .×Sn. In what follows, given a restriction R we denote by Ri the
set of strategies of player i in R.
We now introduce the following notion of reduction between the restrictions R and R′
of G:
R→S R
′
when R 6= R′, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} R′i ⊆Ri and
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀si ∈ Ri \R
′
i ∃s
′
i ∈ Ri si is strictly dominated in R by s
′
i.
That is, R→S R
′ when R′ results from R by removing from it some strictly dominated
strategies.
In general an elimination of strictly dominated strategies is not a one step process; it
is an iterative procedure. Its use is justified by the assumption of common knowledge of
rationality.
Example 3.1. Consider the following game:
L M R
T 3, 0 2, 1 1, 0
C 2, 1 1, 1 1, 0
B 0, 1 0, 1 0, 0
Note that B is strictly dominated by T and R is strictly dominated by M . By elimi-
nating these two strategies we get:
L M
T 3, 0 2, 1
C 2, 1 1, 1
Now C is strictly dominated by T , so we get:
L M
T 3, 0 2, 1
In this game L is strictly dominated by M , so we finally get:
M
T 2, 1

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This brings us to the following notion, where given a binary relation → we denote by
→ ∗ its transitive reflexive closure. Consider a strategic game G. Suppose that G→ ∗SR,
i.e., R is obtained by an iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, in short
IESDS , starting with G.
• If for no restriction R′ of G, R→SR
′ holds, we say that R is an outcome of
IESDS from G.
• If each player is left in R with exactly one strategy, we say that G is solved by
IESDS .
The following simple result clarifies the relation between the IESDS and Nash equi-
librium.
Theorem 3.2 (IESDS). Suppose that G′ is an outcome of IESDS from a strategic game
G.
(i) If s is a Nash equilibrium of G, then it is a Nash equilibrium of G′.
(ii) If G is finite and s is a Nash equilibrium of G′, then it is a Nash equilibrium of G.
(iii) If G is finite and solved by IESDS, then the resulting joint strategy is a unique Nash
equilibrium.
Exercise 1. Provide the proof. 
Example 3.3. A nice example of a game that is solved by IESDS is the location game
due to Hotelling [1929]. Assume that that the players are two vendors who simultaneously
choose a location. Then the customers choose the closest vendor. The profit for each
vendor equals the number of customers it attracted.
To be more specific we assume that the vendors choose a location from the set
{1, . . . , n} of natural numbers, viewed as points on a real line, and that at each loca-
tion there is exactly one customer. For example, for n = 11 we have 11 locations:
and when the players choose respectively the locations 3 and 8:
3
8
we have p1(3, 8) = 5 and p2(3, 8) = 6. When the vendors ‘share’ a customer, they end up
with a fractional payoff.
In general, we have the following game:
• each set of strategies consists of the set {1, . . . , n},
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• each payoff function pi is defined by:
pi(si, s3−i) :=


si + s3−i − 1
2
if si < s3−i
n−
si + s3−i − 1
2
if si > s3−i
n
2
if si = s3−i.
It is easy to see that for n = 2k + 1 this game is solved by k rounds of IESDS, and
that each player is left with the ‘middle’ strategy k. In each round both ‘outer’ strategies
are eliminated, so first 1 and n, and so on. 
There is one more natural question that we left so far unanswered. Is the outcome of an
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies unique, or in game theory parlance:
is strict dominance order independent? The answer is positive. The following result
was established independently by Gilboa et al. [1990] and Stegeman [1990].
Theorem 3.4 (Order Independence I). Given a finite strategic game all iterated elimi-
nations of strictly dominated strategies yield the same outcome.
As noted by Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002] the above result does not hold for infi-
nite strategic games.
Example 3.5. Consider a game in which the set of strategies for each player is the set
of natural numbers. The payoff to each player is the number (strategy) he selected.
Note that in this game every strategy is strictly dominated. Consider now three ways
of using IESDS:
• by removing in one step all strategies that are strictly dominated,
• by removing in one step all strategies different from 0 that are strictly dominated,
• by removing in each step exactly one strategy.
In the first case we obtain the restriction with the empty strategy sets, in the second
one we end up with the restriction in which each player has just one strategy, 0, and in
the third case we obtain an infinite sequence of reductions. 
The above example shows that in the limit of an infinite sequence of reductions different
outcomes can be reached. So for infinite games the definition of the order independence has
to be modified. An interested reader is referred to Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002] and
Apt [2007] where two different options are proposed and some limited order independence
results are established.
The above example also shows that in the IESDS Theorem 3.2(ii) and (iii) we cannot
drop the assumption that the game is finite. Indeed, the above infinite game has no
Nash equilibria, while the game in which each player has exactly one strategy has a Nash
equilibrium.
7
3.2 Elimination of weakly dominated strategies
Analogous considerations can be carried out for the elimination of weakly dominated
strategies, by considering the appropriate reduction relation →W defined in the ex-
pected way. Below we abbreviate iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies
to IEWDS .
However, in the case of IEWDS some complications arise. To illustrate them consider
the following game that results from equipping each player in the Matching Pennies game
with a third strategy E (for Edge):
H T E
H 1,−1 −1, 1 −1,−1
T −1, 1 1,−1 −1,−1
E −1,−1 −1,−1 −1,−1
Note that
• (E,E) is its only Nash equilibrium,
• for each player, E is the only strategy that is weakly dominated.
Any form of elimination of these two E strategies, simultaneous or iterated, yields
the same outcome, namely the Matching Pennies game, that, as we have already noticed,
has no Nash equilibrium. So during this eliminating process we ‘lost’ the only Nash
equilibrium. In other words, part (i) of the IESDS Theorem 3.2 does not hold when
reformulated for weak dominance.
On the other hand, some partial results are still valid here.
Theorem 3.6 (IEWDS). Suppose that G is a finite strategic game.
(i) If G′ is an outcome of IEWDS from G and s is a Nash equilibrium of G′, then s is
a Nash equilibrium of G.
(ii) If G is solved by IEWDS, then the resulting joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium of
G.
Exercise 2. Provide the proof. 
Example 3.7. A nice example of a game that is solved by IEWDS is theBeauty Contest
game due to Moulin [1986]. In this game there are n > 2 players, each with the set of
strategies equal {1, . . . , 100}. Each player submits a number and the payoff to each player
is obtained by splitting 1 equally between the players whose submitted number is closest
to 2
3
of the average. For example, if the submissions are 29, 32, 29, then the payoffs are
respectively 1
2
, 0, 1
2
.
One can check that this game is solved by IEWDS and results in the joint strategy
(1, . . . , 1). Hence, by the IEWDS Theorem 3.6 this joint strategy is a (not necessarily
unique; we shall return to this question in Section 5) Nash equilibrium. 
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Exercise 3. Show that the Beauty Contest game is indeed solved by IEWDS.

Note that in contrast to the IESDS Theorem 3.2 we do not claim in part (ii) of the
IEWDS Theorem 3.6 that the resulting joint strategy is a unique Nash equilibrium. In
fact, such a stronger claim does not hold. Further, in contrast to strict dominance, an
iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies can yield several outcomes.
The following example reveals even more peculiarities of this procedure.
Example 3.8. Consider the following game:
L M R
T 0, 1 1, 0 0, 0
B 0, 0 0, 0 1, 0
It has three Nash equilibria, (T, L), (B,L) and (B,R). This game can be solved by
IEWDS but only if in the first round we do not eliminate all weakly dominated strategies,
which are M and R. If we eliminate only R, then we reach the game
L M
T 0, 1 1, 0
B 0, 0 0, 0
that is solved by IEWDS by eliminating B and M . This yields
L
T 0, 1
So not only IEWDS is not order independent; in some games it is advantageous not to
proceed with the deletion of the weakly dominated strategies ‘at full speed’. The reader
may also check that the second Nash equilibrium, (B,L), can be found using IEWDS, as
well, but not the third one, (B,R).

To summarise, the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies
• can lead to a deletion of Nash equilibria,
• does not need to yield a unique outcome,
• can be too restrictive if we stipulate that in each round all weakly dominated strate-
gies are eliminated.
Finally, note that the above IEWDS Theorem 3.6 does not hold for infinite games.
Indeed, Example 3.5 applies here, as well.
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3.3 Elimination of never best responses
Finally, we consider the process of eliminating strategies that are never best responses
to a joint strategy of the opponents. To motivate this procedure consider the following
game:
X Y
A 2, 1 0, 0
B 0, 1 2, 0
C 1, 1 1, 2
Here no strategy is strictly or weakly dominated. However, C is a never best re-
sponse, that is, it is not a best response to any strategy of the opponent. Indeed, A is
a unique best response to X and B is a unique best response to Y . Clearly, the above
game is solved by an iterated elimination of never best responses. So this procedure can
be stronger than IESDS and IEWDS.
Formally, we introduce the following reduction notion between the restrictions R and
R′ of a given strategic game G:
R→N R
′
when R 6= R′, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} R′i ⊆Ri and
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀si ∈ Ri \R
′
i ¬∃s−i ∈ R−i si is a best response to s−i in R.
That is, R→N R
′ when R′ results from R by removing from it some strategies that are
never best responses.
We then focus on the iterated elimination of never best responses, in short IENBR,
obtained by using the → ∗N relation. The following counterpart of the IESDS Theorem
3.2 then holds.
Theorem 3.9 (IENBR). Suppose that G′ is an outcome of IENBR from a strategic game
G.
(i) If s is a Nash equilibrium of G, then it is a Nash equilibrium of G′.
(ii) If G is finite and s is a Nash equilibrium of G′, then it is a Nash equilibrium of G.
(iii) If G is finite and solved by IENBR, then the resulting joint strategy is a unique Nash
equilibrium.
Exercise 4. Provide the proof. 
Further, as shown by Apt [2005], we have the following analogue of the Order Inde-
pendence I Theorem 3.4.
Theorem 3.10 (Order Independence II). Given a finite strategic game all iterated elim-
inations of never best responses yield the same outcome.
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In the case of infinite games we encounter the same problems as in the case of IESDS
as Example 3.5 readily applies to IENBR, as well. In particular, if we solve an infinite
game by IENBR we cannot claim that we obtained a Nash equilibrium. Still, IENBR can
be useful in such cases.
Example 3.11. Consider the following infinite variant of the location game considered in
Example 3.3. We assume that the players choose their strategies from the open interval
(0, 100) and that at each real in (0, 100) there resides one customer. We have then the
following payoffs that correspond to the intuition that the customers choose the closest
vendor:
pi(si, s3−i) :=


si + s3−i
2
if si < s3−i
100−
si + s3−i
2
if si > s3−i
50 if si = s3−i.
It is easy to check that in this game no strategy strictly or weakly dominates another
one. On the other hand each strategy 50 is a best response to some strategy, namely to
50, and no other strategies are best responses. So this game is solved by IENBR, in one
step. We cannot claim automatically that the resulting joint strategy (50, 50) is a Nash
equilibrium, but it is straightforward to check that this is the case. Moreover, by the
IENBR Theorem 3.9(i) we know that this is a unique Nash equilibrium. 
4 Mixed extension
We now study a special case of infinite strategic games that are obtained in a canonical
way from the finite games, by allowing mixed strategies. Below [0, 1] stands for the real
interval {r ∈ R | 0 ≤ r ≤ 1}. By a probability distribution over a finite non-empty
set A we mean a function
pi : A→ [0, 1]
such that
∑
a∈A pi(a) = 1. We denote the set of probability distributions over A by ∆A.
Consider now a finite strategic game G := (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn). By amixed strat-
egy of player i in G we mean a probability distribution over Si. So ∆Si is the set of mixed
strategies available to player i. In what follows, we denote a mixed strategy of player i
by mi and a joint mixed strategy of the players by m.
Given a mixed strategy mi of player i we define
support(mi) := {a ∈ Si | mi(a) > 0}
and call this set the support of mi. In specific examples we write a mixed strategy mi
as the sum
∑
a∈Ami(a) · a, where A is the support of mi.
Note that in contrast to Si the set ∆Si is infinite. When referring to the mixed
strategies, as in the previous sections, we use the ‘−i’ notation. So form ∈ ∆S1×. . .×∆Sn
we have m−i = (mj)j 6=i, etc.
We can identify each strategy si ∈ Si with the mixed strategy that puts ‘all the weight’
on the strategy si. In this context si will be called a pure strategy . Consequently we
can view Si as a subset of ∆Si and S−i as a subset of ×j 6=i∆Sj .
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By a mixed extension of (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn) we mean the strategic game
(∆S1, . . . ,∆Sn, p1, . . . , pn),
where each function pi is extended in a canonical way from S := S1 × . . .× Sn to M :=
∆S1 × . . .×∆Sn by first viewing each joint mixed strategy m = (m1, . . . , mn) ∈ M as a
probability distribution over S, by putting for s ∈ S
m(s) := m1(s1) · . . . ·mn(sn),
and then by putting
pi(m) :=
∑
s∈S
m(s) · pi(s).
The notion of a Nash equilibrium readily applies to mixed extensions. In this context
we talk about a pure Nash equilibrium , when each of the constituent strategies is pure,
and refer to an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of the mixed extension as aNash equilibrium
in mixed strategies of the initial finite game. In what follows, when we use the letter
m we implicitly refer to the latter Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 4.1 (Characterisation). Consider a finite strategic game
(S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn). The following statements are equivalent:
(i) m is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, i.e.,
pi(m) ≥ pi(m
′
i, m−i)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all m′i ∈ ∆Si,
(ii) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all si ∈ Si
pi(m) ≥ pi(si, m−i),
(iii) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all si ∈ support(mi)
pi(m) = pi(si, m−i)
and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all si 6∈ support(mi)
pi(m) ≥ pi(si, m−i).
Exercise 5. Provide the proof. 
Note that the equivalence between (i) and (ii) implies that each Nash equilibrium of
the initial game is a pure Nash equilibrium of the mixed extension. In turn, the equivalence
between (i) and (iii) provides us with a straightforward way of testing whether a joint
mixed strategy is a Nash equilibrium.
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We now illustrate the use of the above theorem by finding in the Battle of the Sexes
game a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, in addition to the two pure ones exhibited
in Section 3. Take
m1 := r1 · F + (1− r1) · B,
m2 := r2 · F + (1− r2) · B,
where 0 < r1, r2 < 1. By definition
p1(m1, m2) = 2 · r1 · r2 + (1− r1) · (1− r2),
p2(m1, m2) = r1 · r2 + 2 · (1− r1) · (1− r2).
Suppose now that (m1, m2) is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. By the equiv-
alence between (i) and (iii) of the Characterisation Lemma 4.1 p1(F,m2) = p1(B,m2),
i.e., (using r1 = 1 and r1 = 0 in the above formula for p1(·)) 2 · r2 = 1 − r2, and
p2(m1, F ) = p2(m1, B), i.e., (using r2 = 1 and r2 = 0 in the above formula for p2(·))
r1 = 2 · (1− r1). So r2 =
1
3
and r1 =
2
3
.
This implies that for these values of r1 and r2, (m1, m2) is a Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies and we have
p1(m1, m2) = p2(m1, m2) =
2
3
.
The example of the Matching Pennies game illustrated that some strategic games do
not have a Nash equilibrium. In the case of mixed extensions the situation changes and
we have the following fundamental result due to Nash [1950].
Theorem 4.2 (Nash). Every mixed extension of a finite strategic game has a Nash equi-
librium.
In other words, every finite strategic game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
In the case of the Matching Pennies game it is straightforward to check that (1
2
·H + 1
2
·
T, 1
2
·H + 1
2
· T ) is such a Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium the payoffs to each player
are 0.
Nash’s Theorem follows directly from the following result due to Kakutani [1941].2
Theorem 4.3 (Kakutani). Suppose that A is a non-empty compact and convex subset of
Rn and
Φ : A→P(A)
such that
• Φ(x) is non-empty and convex for all x ∈ A,
• the graph of Φ, so the set {(x, y) | y ∈ Φ(x)}, is closed.
Then x∗ ∈ A exists such that x∗ ∈ Φ(x∗). 
2Recall that a subset A of Rn is called compact if it is closed and bounded, and is called convex if
for any x,y ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1] we have αx+ (1− α)y ∈ A.
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Proof of Nash’s Theorem. Fix a finite strategic game (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn). Define the
function besti : ×j 6=i∆Sj →P(∆Si) by
besti(m−i) := {mi ∈ ∆Si | mi is a best response to m−i}.
Then define the function best : ∆S1 × . . .×∆Sn →P(∆S1 × . . .×∆Sn) by
best(m) := best1(m−1)× . . .× best1(m−n).
It is now straightforward to check thatm is a Nash equilibrium iff m ∈ best(m). More-
over, one can easily check that the function best(·) satisfies the conditions of Kakutani’s
Theorem. The fact that for every joint mixed strategy m, best(m) is non-empty is a di-
rect consequence of the Extreme Value Theorem stating that every real-valued continuous
function on a compact subset of Rℓ attains a maximum. 
5 Iterated elimination of strategies II
The notions of dominance apply in particular to mixed extensions of finite strategic games.
But we can also consider dominance of a pure strategy by a mixed strategy. Given a finite
strategic game G := (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn), we say that a (pure) strategy si of player i is
strictly dominated by a mixed strategy mi if
∀s−i ∈ S−i pi(mi, s−i) > pi(si, s−i),
and that si is weakly dominated by a mixed strategy mi if
∀s−i ∈ S−i pi(mi, s−i) ≥ pi(si, s−i) and ∃s−i ∈ S−i pi(mi, s−i) > pi(si, s−i).
In what follows we discuss for these two forms of dominance the counterparts of the
results presented in Section 3.
5.1 Elimination of strictly dominated strategies
Strict dominance by a mixed strategy leads to a stronger notion of strategy elimination.
For example, in the game
L R
T 2, 1 0, 1
M 0, 1 2, 1
B 0, 1 0, 1
the strategy B is strictly dominated neither by T nor M but is strictly dominated by
1
2
· T + 1
2
·M .
We now focus on iterated elimination of pure strategies that are strictly dominated
by a mixed strategy. As in Section 3 we would like to clarify whether it affects the Nash
equilibria, in this case equilibria in mixed strategies.
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Instead of the lengthy wording ‘the iterated elimination of strategies strictly dominated
by a mixed strategy’ we write IESDMS . We have then the following counterpart of the
IESDS Theorem 3.2, where we refer to Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. Given a
restriction G′ of G and a joint mixed strategy m of G, when we say that m is a Nash
equilibrium ofG′ we implicitly stipulate that each strategy used (with positive probability)
in m is a strategy in G′.
Theorem 5.1 (IESDMS). Suppose that G is a finite strategic game.
(i) If G′ is an outcome of IESDMS from G, then m is a Nash equilibrium of G iff it is
a Nash equilibrium of G′.
(ii) If G is solved by IESDMS, then the resulting joint strategy is a unique Nash equilib-
rium of G (in, possibly, mixed strategies).
Exercise 6. Provide the proof. 
To illustrate the use of this result let us return to the Beauty Contest game discussed
in Example 3.7. We explained there why (1, . . . , 1) is a Nash equilibrium. Now we can
draw a stronger conclusion.
Example 5.2. One can show that the Beauty Contest game is solved by IESDMS in 99
rounds. In each round the highest strategy of each player is removed and eventually each
player is left with the strategy 1. On account of the above theorem we now conclude that
(1, . . . , 1) is a unique Nash equilibrium. 
Exercise 7. Show that the Beauty Contest game is indeed solved by IESDMS in 99
rounds. 
As in the case of strict dominance by a pure strategy we now address the question
of whether the outcome of IESDMS is unique. The answer, as before, is positive. The
following result was established by Osborne and Rubinstein [1994].
Theorem 5.3 (Order independence III). All iterated eliminations of strategies strictly
dominated by a mixed strategy yield the same outcome.
5.2 Elimination of weakly dominated strategies
Next, we consider iterated elimination of pure strategies that are weakly dominated by a
mixed strategy.
As already noticed in Subsection 3.2 an elimination by means of weakly dominated
strategies can result in a loss of Nash equilibria. Clearly, the same observation applies
here. We also have the following counterpart of the IEWDS Theorem 3.6, where we refer
to Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. Instead of ‘the iterated elimination of strategies
weakly dominated by a mixed strategy’ we write IEWDMS .
Theorem 5.4 (IEWDMS). Suppose that G is a finite strategic game.
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(i) If G′ is an outcome of IEWDMS from G and m is a Nash equilibrium of G′, then
m is a Nash equilibrium of G.
(ii) If G is solved by IEWDMS, then the resulting joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium of
G.
Here is a simple application of this theorem.
Corollary 5.5. Every mixed extension of a finite strategic game has a Nash equilibrium
such that no strategy used in it is weakly dominated by a mixed strategy.
Proof. It suffices to apply Nash’s Theorem 4.2 to an outcome of IEWDMS and use item
(i) of the above theorem. 
Finally, observe that the outcome of IEWMDS does not need to be unique. In fact,
Example 3.8 applies here, as well.
5.3 Rationalizability
Finally, we consider iterated elimination of strategies that are never best responses to
a joint mixed strategy of the opponents. Following Bernheim [1984] and Pearce [1984],
strategies that survive such an elimination process are called rationalizable strategies.3
Formally, we define rationalizable strategies as follows. Consider a restriction R of a
finite strategic game G. Let
RAT (R) := (S ′1, . . . , S
′
n),
where for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
S ′i := {si ∈ Ri | ∃m−i ∈ ×j 6=i∆Rj si is a best response to m−i in G}.
Note the use of G instead of R in the definition of S ′i. We shall comment on it below.
Consider now the outcome GRAT of iterating RAT starting with G. We call then the
strategies present in the restriction GRAT rationalizable.
We have the following counterpart of the IESDMS Theorem 5.1, due to Bernheim
[1984].
Theorem 5.6. Assume a finite strategic game G.
(i) Then m is a Nash equilibrium of G iff it is a Nash equilibrium of GRAT .
(ii) If each player has in GRAT exactly one strategy, then the resulting joint strategy is
a unique Nash equilibrium of G.
Exercise 8. Provide the proof. 
3More precisely, in each of these papers a different definition is used; see Apt [2007] for an analysis of
the conditions for which these definitions coincide.
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In the context of rationalizability a joint mixed strategy of the opponents is referred to
as a belief . The definition of rationalizability is generic in the class of beliefs w.r.t. which
best responses are collected. For example, we could use here joint pure strategies of
the opponents, or probability distributions over the Cartesian product of the opponents’
strategy sets, so the elements of the set ∆S−i (extending in an expected way the payoff
functions). In the first case we talk about point beliefs and in the second case about
correlated beliefs .
In the case of point beliefs we can apply the elimination procedure entailed by RAT
to arbitrary games. To avoid discussion of the outcomes reached in the case of infinite
iterations we focus on a result for a limited case. We refer here to Nash equilibria in pure
strategies.
Theorem 5.7. Assume a strategic game G. Consider the definition of the RAT operator
for the case of point beliefs and suppose that the outcome GRAT is reached in finitely many
steps.
(i) Then s is a Nash equilibrium of G iff it is a Nash equilibrium of GRAT .
(ii) If each player is left in GRAT with exactly one strategy, then the resulting joint
strategy is a unique Nash equilibrium of G.
Exercise 9. Provide the proof. 
A subtle point is that when G is infinite, the restriction GRAT may have empty strategy
sets (and hence no joint strategy).
Example 5.8. Bertrand competition , originally proposed by Bertrand [1883], is a
game concerned with a simultaneous selection of prices for the same product by two
firms. The product is then sold by the firm that chose a lower price. In the case of a tie
the product is sold by both firms and the profits are split.
Consider a version in which the range of possible prices is the left-open real interval
(0, 100] and the demand equals 100 − p, where p is the lower price. So in this game G
there are two players, each with the set (0, 100] of strategies and the payoff functions are
defined by:
p1(s1, s2) :=


s1(100− s1) if s1 < s2
s1(100− s1)
2
if s1 = s2
0 if s1 > s2
p2(s1, s2) :=


s2(100− s2) if s2 < s1
s2(100− s2)
2
if s1 = s2
0 if s2 > s1.
Consider now each player’s best responses to the strategies of the opponent. Since
s1 = 50 maximises the value of s1(100 − s1) in the interval (0, 100], the strategy 50 is
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the unique best response of the first player to any strategy s2 > 50 of the second player.
Further, no strategy is a best response to a strategy s2 ≤ 50. By symmetry the same
holds for the strategies of the second player.
So the elimination of never best responses leaves each player with a single strategy,
50. In the second round we need to consider the best responses to these two strategies
in the original game G. In G the strategy s1 = 49 is a better response to s2 = 50 than
s1 = 50 and symmetrically for the second player. So in the second round of elimination
both strategies 50 are eliminated and we reach the restriction with the empty strategy
sets. By Theorem 5.7 we conclude that the original game G has no Nash equilibrium.

Note that if we defined S ′i in the definition of the operator RAT using the restriction
R instead of the original game G, the iteration would stop in the above example after
the first round. Such a modified definition of the RAT operator is actually an instance
of the IENBR (iterated elimination of never best responses) in which at each stage all
never best responses are eliminated. So for the above game G we can then conclude by
the IENBR Theorem 3.9(i) that it has at most one equilibrium, namely (50, 50), and then
check separately that in fact it is not a Nash equilibrium.
5.4 A comparison between the introduced notions
We introduced so far the notions of strict dominance, weak dominance, and a best re-
sponse, and related them to the notion of a Nash equilibrium. To conclude this section
we clarify the connections between the notions of dominance and of best response.
Clearly, if a strategy is strictly dominated, then it is a never best response. However,
the converse fails. Further, there is no relation between the notions of weak dominance
and never best response. Indeed, in the game considered in Subsection 3.3 strategy C is a
never best response, yet it is neither strictly nor weakly dominated. Further, in the game
given in Example 3.8 strategy M is weakly dominated and is also a best response to B.
The situation changes in the case of mixed extensions of two-player finite games.
Below, by a totally mixed strategy we mean a mixed strategy with full support, i.e.,
one in which each strategy is used with a strictly positive probability. The following
results were established by Pearce [1984].
Theorem 5.9. Consider a finite two-player strategic game.
(i) A pure strategy is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy iff it is not a best response
to a mixed strategy.
(ii) A pure strategy is weakly dominated by a mixed strategy iff it is not a best response
to a totally mixed strategy.
We only prove here part (i). Pearce [1984] provides a short, but a bit tricky proof
based on Nash’s Theorem 4.2. The proof we provide, due to Fudenberg and Tirole [1991],
is a bit more intuitive.
We shall use the following result, see, e.g., Rockafellar [1996].
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Theorem 5.10 (Separating Hyperplane). Let A and B be disjoint convex subsets of Rk.
Then there exists a non-zero c ∈ Rk and d ∈ R such that
c · x ≥ d for all x ∈ A,
c · y ≤ d for all y ∈ B.
Proof of Theorem 5.9(i).
Clearly, if a pure strategy is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy, then it is not a
best response to a mixed strategy. To prove the converse, fix a two-player strategic game
(S1, S2, p1, p2). Also fix i ∈ {1, 2} and abbreviate 3− i to −i.
Suppose that a strategy si ∈ Si is not strictly dominated by a mixed strategy. Let
A := {x ∈ R|S−i| | ∀s−i ∈ S−i xs
−i
> 0}
and
B := {(pi(mi, s−i)− pi(si, s−i))s
−i∈S−i | mi ∈ ∆Si}.
By the choice of si the sets A and B are disjoint. Moreover, both sets are convex subsets
of R|S−i|.
By the Separating Hyperplane Theorem 5.10 for some non-zero c ∈ R|S−i| and d ∈ R
c · x ≥ d for all x ∈ A, (1)
c · y ≤ d for all y ∈ B. (2)
But 0 ∈ B, so by (2) d ≥ 0. Hence by (1) and the definition of A for all s−i ∈ S−i we
have cs
−i
≥ 0. Again by (1) and the definition of A this excludes the contingency that
d > 0, i.e., d = 0. Hence by (2)∑
s
−i∈S−i
cs
−i
pi(mi, s−i) ≤
∑
s
−i∈S−i
cs
−i
pi(si, s−i) for all mi ∈ ∆Si. (3)
Let c¯ :=
∑
s
−i∈S−i
cs
−i
. By the assumption c¯ 6= 0. Take
m−i :=
∑
s
−i∈S−i
cs
−i
c¯
s−i.
Then (3) can be rewritten as
pi(mi, m−i) ≤ pi(si, m−i) for all mi ∈ ∆Si,
i.e., si is a best response to m−i. 
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6 Variations on the definition of strategic games
The notion of a strategic game is quantitative in the sense that it refers through payoffs
to real numbers. A natural question to ask is: do the payoff values matter? The answer
depends on which concepts we want to study. We mention here three qualitative variants
of the definition of a strategic game in which the payoffs are replaced by preferences. By
a preference relation on a set A we mean here a linear order on A.
In Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] a strategic game is defined as a sequence
(S1, . . . , Sn,1, . . . ,n),
where each i is player’s i preference relation defined on the set S1× · · ·×Sn of joint
strategies.
In Apt et al. [2008] another modification of strategic games is considered, called a
strategic game with parametrised preferences . In this approach each player i has
a non-empty set of strategies Si and a preference relation s
−i
on Si parametrised
by a joint strategy s−i of his opponents. In Apt et al. [2008] only strict preferences were
considered and so defined finite games with parametrised preferences were compared with
the concept of CP-nets (Conditional Preference nets), a formalism used for representing
conditional and qualitative preferences, see, e.g., Boutilier et al. [2004].
Next, in Roux et al. [2008] conversion/preference games are introduced. Such a
game for n players consists of a set S of situations and for each player i a preference
relation i on S and a conversion relation → i on S. The definition is very general
and no conditions are placed on the preference and conversion relations. These games are
used to formalise gene regulation networks and some aspects of security.
Finally, let us mention another generalisation of strategic games, called graphical
games , introduced by Kearns et al. [2001]. These games stress the locality in taking a
decision. In a graphical game the payoff of each player depends only on the strategies of
its neighbours in a given in advance graph structure over the set of players. Formally,
such a game for n players with the corresponding strategy sets S1, . . . , Sn is defined by
assuming a neighbour function N that given a player i yields its set of neighbours N(i).
The payoff for player i is then a function pi from ×j∈N(i)∪{i}Sj to R.
In all mentioned variants it is straightforward to define the notion of a Nash equi-
librium. For example, in the conversion/preferences games it is defined as a situation s
such that for all players i, if s→ is
′, then s′ 6≻i s. However, other introduced notions
can be defined only for some variants. In particular, Pareto efficiency cannot be defined
for strategic games with parametrised preferences since it requires a comparison of two
arbitrary joint strategies. In turn, the notions of dominance cannot be defined for the
conversion/preferences games, since they require the concept of a strategy for a player.
Various results concerning finite strategic games, for instance the IESDS Theorem 3.2,
carry over directly to the strategic games as defined in Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] or
in Apt et al. [2008]. On the other hand, in the variants of strategic games that rely on the
notion of a preference we cannot consider mixed strategies, since the outcomes of playing
different strategies by a player cannot be aggregated.
20
7 Mechanism design
Mechanism design is one of the important areas of economics. The 2007 Nobel Prize in
Economics went to three economists who laid its foundations. To quote from The Economist 2007,
mechanism design deals with the problem of ‘how to arrange our economic interactions
so that, when everyone behaves in a self-interested manner, the result is something we all
like’. So these interactions are supposed to yield desired social decisions when each agent
is interested in maximising only his own utility.
In mechanism design one is interested in the ways of inducing the players to submit
true information. This subject is closely related to game theory, though it focuses on
other issues. In the next section we shall clarify this connection. To discuss mechanism
design in more detail we need to introduce some basic concepts.
Assume a set {1, . . . , n} of players with n > 1, a non-empty set of decisions D, and
for each player i
• a non-empty set of types Θi, and
• an initial utility function vi : D ×Θi → R.
In this context a type is some private information known only to the player, for example,
in the case of an auction, the player’s valuation of the items for sale.
When discussing types and sets of types we use then the same abbreviations as in
Section 2. In particular, we define Θ := Θ1×· · ·×Θn and for θ ∈ Θ we have (θi, θ−i) = θ.
A decision rule is a function f : Θ→ D. We call the tuple
(D,Θ1, . . . ,Θn, v1, . . . , vn, f)
a decision problem .
Decision problems are considered in the presence of a central authority who takes
decisions on the basis of the information provided by the players. Given a decision problem
the desired decision is obtained through the following sequence of events, where f is a
given, publicly known, decision rule:
• each player i receives (becomes aware of) his type θi ∈ Θi,
• each player i announces to the central authority a type θ′i ∈ Θi; this yields a joint
type θ′ := (θ′1, . . . , θ
′
n),
• the central authority then takes the decision d := f(θ′) and communicates it to each
player,
• the resulting initial utility for player i is then vi(d, θi).
The difficulty in taking decisions through the above described sequence of events is
that players are assumed to be rational, that is they want to maximise their utility. As a
result they may submit false information to manipulate the outcome (decision). To better
understand the notion of a decision problem consider the following two natural examples.
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Example 7.1. [Sealed-bid Auction]
We consider a sealed-bid auction in which there is a single object for sale. Each
player (bidder) simultaneously submits to the central authority his type (bid) in a sealed
envelope and the object is allocated to the highest bidder.
Given a sequence a := (a1, . . . , aj) of reals denote the least l such that al = maxk∈{1,...,j} ak
by argsmax a. Then we can model a sealed-bid auction as the following decision problem
(D,Θ1, . . . , Θn, v1, . . . , vn, f):
• D = {1, . . . , n},
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Θi = R+; θi ∈ Θi is player’s i valuation of the object,
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, vi(d, θi) := (d = i)θ, where d = i is a Boolean expression with
the value 0 or 1,
• f(θ) := argsmax θ.
Here decision d ∈ D indicates to which player the object is sold. Further, f(θ) = i,
where
θi = maxj∈{1,...,n} θj and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1} θj < θi.
So we assume that in the case of a tie the object is allocated to the highest bidder with
the lowest index.

Example 7.2. [Public project problem]
This problem deals with the task of taking a joint decision concerning construction
of a public good ,4 for example a bridge. Each player reports to the central authority
his appreciation of the gain from the project when it takes place. If the sum of the
appreciations exceeds the cost of the project, the project takes place and each player has
to pay the same fraction of the cost. Otherwise the project is cancelled.
This problem corresponds to the following decision problem, where c, with c > 0, is
the cost of the project:
• D = {0, 1} (reflecting whether a project is cancelled or takes place),
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Θi = R+,
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, vi(d, θi) := d(θi −
c
n
),
• f(θ) :=
{
1 if
∑n
i=1 θi ≥ c
0 otherwise.
If the project takes place (d = 1), c
n
is the cost share of the project for each player. 
4In Economics public goods are so-called not excludable and non-rival goods. To quote from Mankiw
[2001]: ‘People cannot be prevented from using a public good, and one person’s enjoyment of a public
good does not reduce another person’s enjoyment of it.’
22
Let us return now to the decision rules. We call a decision rule f efficient if for all
θ ∈ Θ and d′ ∈ D
n∑
i=1
vi(f(θ), θi) ≥
n∑
i=1
vi(d
′, θi).
Intuitively, this means that for all θ ∈ Θ, f(θ) is a decision that maximises the initial
social welfare from a decision d, defined by
∑n
i=1 vi(d, θi). It is easy to check that the
decision rules used in Examples 7.1 and 7.2 are efficient.
Let us return now to the subject of manipulations. As an example, consider the case
of the public project problem. A player whose type (that is, appreciation of the gain
from the project) exceeds the cost share c
n
should manipulate the outcome and announce
the type c. This will guarantee that the project will take place, irrespective of the types
announced by the other players. Analogously, a player whose type is lower than c
n
should
submit the type 0 to minimise the chance that the project will take place.
To prevent such manipulations we use taxes , which are transfer payments between
the players and central authority. This leads to a modification of the initial decision
problem (D,Θ1, . . . ,Θn, v1, . . . , vn, f) to the following one:
• the set of decisions is D × Rn,
• the decision rule is a function (f, t) : Θ→D×Rn, where t : Θ→Rn and (f, t)(θ) :=
(f(θ), t(θ)),
• the final utility function of player i is the function ui : D×R
n×Θi →R defined
by
ui(d, t1, . . . , tn, θi) := vi(d, θi) + ti.
We call then (D × Rn,Θ1, . . . ,Θn, u1, . . . , un, (f, t)) a direct mechanism and refer to t
as the tax function .
So when the received (true) type of player i is θi and his announced type is θ
′
i, his
final utility is
ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) = vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) + ti(θ
′
i, θ−i),
where θ−i are the types announced by the other players.
In each direct mechanism, given the vector θ of announced types, t(θ) := (t1(θ), . . . , tn(θ))
is the vector of the resulting payments. If ti(θ) ≥ 0, player i receives from the central
authority ti(θ), and if ti(θ) < 0, he pays to the central authority |ti(θ)|.
The following definition then captures the idea that taxes prevent manipulations. We
say that a direct mechanism with tax function t is incentive compatible if for all θ ∈ Θ,
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and θ′i ∈ Θi
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi).
Intuitively, this means that for each player i announcing one’s true type (θi) is better than
announcing another type (θ′i). That is, false announcements, i.e., manipulations, do not
pay off.
From now on we focus on specific incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Each
Groves mechanism is a direct mechanism obtained by using a tax function t(·) :=
(t1(·), . . . , tn(·)), where for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
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• ti : Θ→R is defined by ti(θ) := gi(θ) + hi(θ−i), where
• gi(θ) :=
∑
j 6=i vj(f(θ), θj),
• hi : Θ−i →R is an arbitrary function.
Note that, not accidentally, vi(f(θ), θi) + gi(θ) is simply the initial social welfare from
the decision f(θ).
The importance of Groves mechanisms is then revealed by the following crucial result
due to Groves [1973].
Theorem 7.3 (Groves). Consider a decision problem (D,Θ1, . . . ,Θn, v1, . . . , vn, f) with
an efficient decision rule f . Then each Groves mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof. The proof is remarkably straightforward. Since f is efficient, for all θ ∈ Θ,
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and θ′i ∈ Θi we have
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) =
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θi, θ−i), θj) + hi(θ−i)
≥
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θj) + hi(θ−i)
= ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi).

When for a given direct mechanism for all θ ∈ Θ we have
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) ≤ 0, the mecha-
nism is called feasible, which means that it can be realised without external financing.
Each Groves mechanism is uniquely determined by the functions h1, . . ., hn. A special
case, called the pivotal mechanism , is obtained by using
hi(θ−i) := −max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θj).
So then
ti(θ) =
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ), θj)−max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θj).
Hence for all θ and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have ti(θ) ≤ 0, which means that the pivotal
mechanism is feasible and that each player needs to make the payment |ti(θ)| to the central
authority.
We noted already that the decision rules used in Examples 7.1 and 7.2 are efficient.
So in each example Groves’ Theorem 7.3 applies and in particular the pivotal mechanism
is incentive compatible. Let us see now the details.
Re: Example 7.1 Given a sequence θ of reals we denote by θ∗ its reordering from the
largest to the smallest element. So for example, for θ = (1, 5, 4, 3, 2) we have (θ−2)
∗
2 = 3
since θ−2 = (1, 4, 3, 2).
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To compute the taxes in the sealed-bid auction in the case of the pivotal mechanism
we use the following observation.
Note 7.4. In the sealed-bid auction we have for the pivotal mechanism
ti(θ) =
{
−θ∗2 if i = argsmax θ
0 otherwise.
Exercise 10. Provide the proof. 
So the highest bidder wins the object and pays for it the amount maxj 6=i θj.
The resulting sealed-bid auction was introduced by Vickrey [1961] and is called a
Vickrey auction . To illustrate it suppose there are three players, A, B, and C whose
true types (bids) are respectively 18, 21, and 24. When they bid truthfully the object
is allocated to player C whose tax (payment) according to Note 7.4 is 21, so the second
price offered. Table 1 summarises the situation.
player type tax ui
A 18 0 0
B 21 0 0
C 24 −21 3
Table 1: The pivotal mechanism for the sealed-bid auction
This explains why this auction is alternatively called a second-price auction . By
Groves’ Theorem 7.3 this auction is incentive compatible. In contrast, the first-price
auction , in which the winner pays the price he offered (so the first, or the highest price),
is not incentive compatible. Indeed, reconsider the above example. If player C submits
22 instead of his true type 24, he then wins the object but needs to pay 22 instead of 24.
More formally, in the direct mechanism corresponding to the first-price auction we have
uC((f, t)(18, 21, 22), 24) = 24− 22 = 2 > 0 = uC((f, t)(18, 21, 24), 24),
which contradicts incentive compatibility for the joint type (18, 21, 24). 
Re: Example 7.2 To compute the taxes in the public project problem in the case of the
pivotal mechanism we use the following observation.
Note 7.5. In the public project problem we have for the pivotal mechanism
ti(θ) =


0 if
∑
j 6=i θj ≥
n−1
n
c and
∑n
j=1 θj ≥ c∑
j 6=i θj −
n−1
n
c if
∑
j 6=i θj <
n−1
n
c and
∑n
j=1 θj ≥ c
0 if
∑
j 6=i θj ≤
n−1
n
c and
∑n
j=1 θj < c
n−1
n
c−
∑
j 6=i θj if
∑
j 6=i θj >
n−1
n
c and
∑n
j=1 θj < c.
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Exercise 11. Provide the proof. 
To illustrate the pivotal mechanism suppose that c = 30 and that there are three
players, A, B, and C whose true types are respectively 6, 7, and 25. When these types are
announced the project takes place and Table 2 summarises the taxes that players need to
pay and their final utilities. The taxes were computed using Note 7.5.
player type tax ui
A 6 0 −4
B 7 0 −3
C 25 −7 8
Table 2: The pivotal mechanism for the public project problem
Suppose now that the true types of players are respectively 4, 3 and 22 and, as before,
c = 30. When these types are also the announced types, the project does not take place.
Still, some players need to pay a tax, as Table 3 illustrates. One can show that this
deficiency is shared by all feasible incentive compatible direct mechanisms for the public
project, see [Mas-Collel et al., 1995, page 861-862].
player type tax ui
A 4 −5 −5
B 3 −6 −6
C 22 0 0
Table 3: The pivotal mechanism for the public project problem
8 Pre-Bayesian games
Mechanism design, as introduced in the previous section, can be explained in game-
theoretic terms using pre-Bayesian games, introduced by Ashlagi et al. [2006] (see also
Hyafil and Boutilier [2004] and Aghassi and Bertsimas [2006]). In strategic games, after
each player selected his strategy, each player knows the payoff of every other player. This
is not the case in pre-Bayesian games in which each player has a private type on which
he can condition his strategy. This distinguishing feature of pre-Bayesian games explains
why they form a class of games with incomplete information. Formally, they are defined
as follows.
Assume a set {1, . . . , n} of players, where n > 1. A pre-Bayesian game for n
players consists of
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• a non-empty set Ai of actions ,
• a non-empty set Θi of types ,
• a payoff function pi : A1 × . . .×An ×Θi → R,
for each player i.
Let A := A1 × . . . × An. In a pre-Bayesian game Nature (an external agent) moves
first and provides each player i with a type θi ∈ Θi. Each player knows only his type.
Subsequently the players simultaneously select their actions. The payoff function of each
player now depends on his type, so after all players selected their actions, each player
knows his payoff but does not know the payoffs of the other players. Note that given a
pre-Bayesian game, every joint type θ ∈ Θ uniquely determines a strategic game, to which
we refer below as a θ-game.
A strategy for player i in a pre-Bayesian game is a function si : Θi → Ai. The previ-
ously introduced notions can be naturally adjusted to pre-Bayesian games. In particular,
a joint strategy s(·) := (s1(·), . . . , sn(·)) is called an ex-post equilibrium if
∀θ ∈ Θ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀ai ∈ Ai pi(si(θi), s−i(θ−i), θi) ≥ pi(ai, s−i(θ−i), θi),
where s−i(θ−i) is an abbreviation for the sequence of actions (sj(θj))j 6=i.
In turn, a strategy si(·) for player i is called dominant if
∀θi ∈ Θi ∀a ∈ A pi(si(θi), a−i, θi) ≥ pi(ai, a−i, θi).
So s(·) is an ex-post equilibrium iff for every joint type θ ∈ Θ the sequence of actions
(s1(θ1), . . . , sn(θn)) is a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding θ-game. Further, si(·) is a
dominant strategy of player i iff for every type θi ∈ Θi, si(θi) is a dominant strategy of
player i in every (θi, θ−i)-game.
We also have the following immediate counterpart of the Dominant Strategy Note 2.1.
Note 8.1 (Dominant Strategy). Consider a pre-Bayesian game G. Suppose that s(·) is a
joint strategy such that each si(·) is a dominant strategy. Then it is an ex-post equilibrium
of G.
Example 8.2. As an example of a pre-Bayesian game, suppose that
• Θ1 = {U,D}, Θ2 = {L,R},
• A1 = A2 = {F,B},
and consider the pre-Bayesian game uniquely determined by the following four θ-games.
Here and below we marked the payoffs in Nash equilibria in these θ-games in bold.
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UL
F B
F 2, 1 2, 0
B 0, 1 2, 1
R
F B
F 2, 0 2, 1
B 0, 0 2, 1
D
F B
F 3, 1 2, 0
B 5, 1 4, 1
F B
F 3, 0 2, 1
B 5, 0 4, 1
This shows that the strategies s1(·) and s2(·) such that
s1(U) := F, s1(D) := B, s2(L) = F, s2(R) = B
form here an ex-post equilibrium. 
However, there is a crucial difference between strategic games and pre-Bayesian games.
Example 8.3. Consider the following pre-Bayesian game:
• Θ1 = {U,B}, Θ2 = {L,R},
• A1 = A2 = {C,D}.
U
L
C D
C 2, 2 0, 0
D 3, 0 1, 1
R
C D
C 2, 1 0, 0
D 3, 0 1, 2
B
C D
C 1, 2 3, 0
D 0, 0 2, 1
C D
C 1, 1 3, 0
D 0, 0 2, 2
Even though each θ-game has a Nash equilibrium, they are so ‘positioned’ that the pre-
Bayesian game has no ex-post equilibrium. Even more, if we consider a mixed extension of
this game, then the situation does not change. The reason is that no new Nash equilibria
are then added to the ‘constituent’ θ-games. (Indeed, each of them is solved by IESDS
and hence by the IESDMS Theorem 5.1(ii) has a unique Nash equilibrium.) This shows
that a mixed extension of a finite pre-Bayesian game does not need to have an ex-post
equilibrium, which contrasts with the existence of Nash equilibria in mixed extensions of
finite strategic games. 
To relate pre-Bayesian games to mechanism design we need one more notion. We say
that a pre-Bayesian game is of a revelation-type if Ai = Θi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. So in
a revelation-type pre-Bayesian game the strategies of a player are the functions on his set
of types. A strategy for player i is called then truth-telling if it is the identity function
pii(·) on Θi.
Now, as explained in Ashlagi et al. [2006] mechanism design can be viewed as an
instance of the revelation-type pre-Bayesian games. Indeed, we have the following imme-
diate, yet revealing observation.
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Theorem 8.4. Given a direct mechanism
(D × Rn,Θ1, . . . ,Θn, u1, . . . , un, (f, t))
associate with it a revelation-type pre-Bayesian game, in which each payoff function pi is
defined by
pi((θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) := ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi).
Then the mechanism is incentive compatible iff in the associated pre-Bayesian game for
each player truth-telling is a dominant strategy.
By Groves’s Theorem 7.3 we conclude that in the pre-Bayesian game associated with
a Groves mechanism, (pi1(·), . . . , pin(·)) is a dominant strategy ex-post equilibrium.
9 Conclusions
9.1 Bibliographic remarks
Historically, the notion of an equilibrium in a strategic game occurred first in Cournot
[1838] in his study of production levels of a homogeneous product in a duopoly competi-
tion. The celebrated von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem proved by von Neumann [1928]
establishes an existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies in two-player zero-sum
games. An alternative proof of Nash’s Theorem, given in Nash [1951], uses Brouwer’s
Fixed Point Theorem.
Ever since Nash established his celebrated theorem, a search has continued to gen-
eralise his result to a larger class of games. A motivation for this endeavour has been
the existence of natural infinite games that are not mixed extensions of finite games. As
an example of such an early result let us mention the following theorem due to Debreu
[1952], Fan [1952] and Glicksberg [1952].
Theorem 9.1. Consider a strategic game such that
• each strategy set is a non-empty compact convex subset of a complete metric space,
• each payoff function pi is continuous and quasi-concave in the ith argument.
5
Then a Nash equilibrium exists.
More recent work in this area focused on the existence of Nash equilibria in games
with non-continuous payoff functions, see in particular Reny [1999] and Bich [2006].
The issue of complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium has been a long standing open
problem, clarified only recently, see Daskalakis et al. [2009] for an account of these devel-
opments. Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and of weakly dominated
strategies was introduced by Gale [1953] and Luce and Raiffa [1957]. The corresponding
results summarised in Theorems 3.2, 3.6, 5.1 and 5.4 are folklore results.
5Recall that the function pi : S→R is quasi-concave in the ith argument if the set
{s′
i
∈ Si | pi(s
′
i
, s−i) ≥ pi(s)} is convex for all s ∈ S.
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Apt [2004] provides uniform proofs of various order independence results, including
the Order Independence Theorems 3.4 and 5.3. The computational complexity of iterated
elimination of strategies has been studied starting with Knuth et al. [1988], and with
Brandt et al. [2009] as a recent contribution.
There is a lot of work on formal aspects of common knowledge and of its consequences
for game theory. see, e.g., Aumann [1999] and Battigalli and Bonanno [1999].
9.2 Suggestions for further reading
Strategic games form a large research area and we have barely scratched its surface. There
are several other equilibria notions and various other types of games.
Many books provide introductions to various areas of game theory, including strategic
games. Most of them are written from the perspective of applications to Economics. In the
1990s the leading textbooks were Myerson [1991], Binmore [1991], Fudenberg and Tirole
[1991] and Osborne and Rubinstein [1994].
Moving to the next decade, Osborne [2005] is an excellent, broad in its scope, un-
dergraduate level textbook, while Peters [2008] is probably the best book on the market
on the graduate level. Undeservedly less known is the short and lucid Tijs [2003]. An
elementary, short introduction, focusing on the concepts, is Shoham and Leyton-Brown
[2008]. In turn, Ritzberger [2002] is a comprehensive book on strategic games that also
extensively discusses extensive games , i.e., games in which the players choose actions
in turn. Finally, Binmore [2007] is a thoroughly revised version of Binmore [1991].
Several textbooks on microeconomics include introductory chapters on game the-
ory, including strategic games. Two good examples are Mas-Collel et al. [1995] and
Jehle and Reny [2000]. Finally, Nisan et al. [2007] is a recent collection of surveys and
introductions to the computational aspects of game theory, with a number of articles
concerned with strategic games and mechanism design.
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